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STUDENT SYMPOSIUM

PROCEDURE BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
BOARD AND ON APPEAL TO THE COURTS
The Industrial Accident Board is the administrative agency created to enforce and administer the Workmen's Compensation Act. 256 The Board consists of an employer of labor in some industry or business covered by the
Workmen's Compensation Act, a wage earner in a business industry covered
257
by the Act, and a practicing attorney.
The purpose of the Board, as stated in Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Knouff,258 "was to afford to the injured employee a forum in which
he can present his claim for compensation, have its merits determined and
'259
appropriate relief speedily awarded.
JURISDICTION

The Industrial Accident Board has exclusive original jurisdiction over all
claims arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 260

A workmen's

compensation case therefore cannot be brought before a court until the Board
has passed upon the claim. 261 The Board's decisions and rulings are binding
262
upon the parties in the absence of legal action to set them aside.
In most instances, a subscriber under the Workmen's Compensation Act
will notify the insurer of any injuries sustained by his employees, and the
insurer will begin making the required compensation payments without any
proceedings before the Board. 26 In the event that payments are not made,
however, the employee may seek relief by filing a claim with the 'Board.264
An employee must comply with two procedural requirements in order to
256. See Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, §§ 1, 4 (1967).
257. Id. § 2. The Board has been given the power to appoint all employees necessary
to properly administer the Act. Id. § 3.
258. 271 S.W. 633 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1925, writ ref'd).
259. Id. at 635.
260. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 488 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Knouff, 271 S.W. 633, 637
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1925, writ ref'd).
261. Industrial Accident Bd. v. Glenn, 144 Tex. 378, 382, 190 S.W.2d 805, 807-808
(1945); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 488 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Huntsman, 125 S.W.2d 431,
436 (Tex. Civ. App.-Forth Worth 1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.); see Associated Indus.
Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 16 F.2d 464, 465 (N.D. Tex. 1926).
262. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Knouff, 1271 S.W. 633, 636 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1925, writ ref'd); see Paradissis v. Royal Indem. Co., 496 S.W.2d 146, 150 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973), af 'd, 507 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Sup. 1974).
263. Booth v. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n, 132 Tex. 237, 242, 123 S.W.2d 322, 325
(1938); Hotchkiss v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 479 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Amarillo 1972, no writ).
264. See TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (1967); Booth v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 132 Tex. 237, 242, 123 S.W.2d 322, 325 (1934); Hotchkiss v. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n, 479 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, no writ).
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bring his claim within the jurisdiction of the Board. First, if the association
or subscriber does not have notice of his injury, the employee must give such
notice to the association or employer within 30 days after the occurrence
2 65
of the injury or the first distinct manifestation of an occupational disease.
Since the purpose of this requirement is to enable the insurer to investigate
the facts upon which the employee bases his claim, 26 6 the employee has no
duty to give notice of his injury to the association or employer if the employer
has notice through actual knowledge of the injury. 267 Notice may be established as a matter of law where the employer or supervisor has witnessed an
accident in which the employee was known to have been injured, or where
it was obvious that the employee could not have escaped injury from the accident.268 If the injury is not so "spectacular," however, notice becomes a
question of fact: whether the circumstances surrounding the accident were
such as to lead a reasonable man observing them to conclude that a compensable injury had been sustained.26 9 This test was established in Miller v.
Texas Employers' Insurance Association,270 where the alleged injury resulted
from a "slip and fall" accident which was witnessed by the plaintiff's employer and his supervisor. The employee failed to notify his employer within
30 days that he had been injured in the accident, and the insurer contended
,that the employee had thereby waived his right to compensation benefits. The
court of civil appeals interpreted the notice requirement of article 8307, section 4a to mean that the statute required notice of an injury, and not merely
notice of an "accident" or "incident."' 271 The court held that there was a
question of fact as to whether the employer had received notice that the em2 72
ployee had sustained a compensable injury.
In the absence of actual knowledge of the insurer, employer, or the employer's supervisor,2 7a the employee must give one of such persons notice of
the date, time, occasion and nature of the injury within 30 days after the
265. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (1967).
266. Booth v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 132 Tex. 237, 242, 123 S.W.2d 322, 325
(1938); Hotchkiss v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 479 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Amarillo 1972, no writ).
267. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 4a (1967); see Hotchkiss v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 479 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, no writ).
268. Miller v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 488 S.W.2d 489, 492 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bray v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 483 S.W.2d 907,
911 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
269. See Miller v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 488 S.W.2d 489, 492 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 491.
272. Id. at 492.
273. Notice to the employer's supervisor or designated agent is imputed to the employer. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 488 S.W.2d 565, 573 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hotchkiss v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 479 S.W.2d
336, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, no writ); Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Thomas,
428 S.W.2d 463, 468 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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injury was sustained.2 7 4 The notice may be given either orally or in writing,
although written notice is preferred.27 5 When the employee has given timely
notice of his injury, he has satisfied the first of the two procedural requirements necessary to obtain a hearing from the Industrial Accident Board.
The second procedural requirement for jurisdiction is that a claim for compensation must be submitted to the Board within 6 months after the occur27
rence of the injury or of the first manifestation of an occupational disease. 6
Additionally, in case of death to the employee or in the event of his mental
or physical incapacity, a claim must be filed by his beneficiaries within 6
months after his death or by the employee within 6 months after the termina277
tion of the incapacity.
Since the Industrial Accident Board is an administrative agency, a claim
for compensation is submitted to it in the form of a brief or a letter, rather
than as a formal petition.278 The Board has ruled that any written communication by an employee "giving his name, the date and the general nature of
injury, and the name of his employer shall constitute a claim. ' ' 279 If 'the employee is represented by an attorney, however, the Industrial Accident Board
has ruled that a written brief must be filed with the Board not less than 2
days prior to the hearing date.280 This brief must establish the following:
(1) Employment by the named insured on the date of injury.
(2) Date of injury or last exposure in case of an occupational disease.
(3) Wage rate of claimant on date of injury.
(4) Establishment of accidental injury.
(5) Location of accident.
(6) Facts to support the extent of claimed disability.
(7) Wage earning capacity loss, if any.
28
(8) Hardship, if applicable. '
274. Hotchkiss v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 479 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Amarillo 1972, no writ). In Hotchkiss, the employee was denied compensation because, although he informed his supervisor he had injured himself, he did not state the
date or occasion of the injury, nor that he had sustained the injury in the scope of his
employment. Id. at 339.
275. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 488 S.W.2d 565, 573 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hotchkiss v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 479 S.W.2d
336, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, no writ); Royal Indem. Co. v. Jones, 201
S.W.2d 129, 133 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
276. TEx. REV.CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (1967).
277. Id.; see Baker v. Travelers Ins. Co., 483 S.W.2d 10, 11 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, no writ).

278.

INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT

BD. R. 4.040; see Booth v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n.

132 Tex. 237, 242, 123 S.W.2d 322, 325 (1938).
279. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BD.R. 4.040.
280. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BD. R. 5.080.

281. Id.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 6 [2022], No. 3, Art. 7

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6: 608

If the attorney fails to comply with this rule, the Board may postpone the
28 2
hearing date.
Failure to satisfy the requirements either of notice or of filing may prevent
the claim from being reviewed by the Board. 283 The Board has the statutory
power, however, to waive strict compliance with these requirements for good
cause. 284 To establish good cause the claimant must allege and prove that
he prosecuted his claim with that degree of diligence that a person of ordinary
2 5
prudence would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.
The claimant must prove not only that good cause existed for not meeting
the 30-day or the 6-month requirements, but also that such good cause was
continuous and existed up to the date of the notice or the filing of the
claim. 286 For example, if a claim were filed 8 months after injury, the
employee would have to show that good cause existed for the entire 8
months, rather than only for the initial 6-month period. 287 If good cause is
not established, the Board will be without authority to review the claim, and
the employee will not obtain compensation benefits even though his disability
288
is otherwise compensable.

Since the test for good cause is "reasonableness, ' 28 9 the validity of each
allegation of good cause will be determined by the Board, or by the court

on appeal after considering the particular facts and circumstances involved.2 90

282. Although the writer has found no instances in which the Board has done so,
the rule does state that the attorney must file the brief.
283. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (1967); see Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Warren, 447 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
284. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 4a (1967); see Akin, Workmen's Compensation, 26 Sw. L.J. 177 (1972); Collins, Workmen's Compensation, 28 Sw. L.J. 131,
138 (1974).
285. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hughes, 497 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. Sup. 1973); Torres
v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 457 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex. Sup. 1970); Moronko v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 435 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. Sup. 1968); Bray v. Texas Employers'
Ins. Ass'n, 483 S.W.2d 907, 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd
n~r~e.); TraveleT9 Ins. Co. v. Warren, 447 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dishongh v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 438 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1968, no writ). See also Akin, Workmen's Compensation, 26 Sw.
L.J. 177 (1972).
286. Baker v. Travelers Ins. Co., 483 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1972, no writ); Maleski v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 471 S.W.2d 416, 420
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1971, no writ); Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Dewett,
460 S.W.2d 468, 470 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Warren, 447 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
287. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Warren, 447 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. Civ. App,-Tyler
1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
288. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (1967).
289. Aetna Cas. & Sur* Co. V. Hughes, 497 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. Sup, 1973); Torres
v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 457 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex. Sup. 1970); Moronko v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 435 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. Sup. 1968).
290. Moronko v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 435 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. Sup. 1968);
see Maleski v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 471 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1971, no writ).
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For example, good cause for non-compliance has been held to have been es291
tablished where the employee reasonably believed his injury was not serious,
but not where the employee should have known that he had sustained a compensable injury. 292 Additionally, good cause has been found to have existed
where the employee relied for a reasonable period of time on statements
made by his employer that everything would be taken care of, 29s but not
where the claimant was ignorant of the filing requirement or where he mistakenly believed that compensation was not available for his particular injury. 294 Case law illustrates that as the period of time for non-compliance
increases, the chances of proving good cause diminish. 29 5
There is an additional situation in which the employee may escape the requirement of filing a claim for compensation within 6 months after the occurrence of his injury. The Workmen's Compensation Act requires every subscriber who has notice of an injury to an employee to file a report of such
injury within 8 days after the occurrence of the accident, or within 8 days
after the employee notifies the employer of a manifestation of an occupational disease. 296 The employee has 6 months from the day his employer
files this report in which to file his claim for compensation. 29 7
POWERS OF THE BOARD

In order to fulfill its responsibilities, the Board has been given not only
many quasi-judicial powers, 298 but also -the quasi-legislative authority to make
rules necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act. 299 The rules pronounced by the Board have the effect and force of law so long as they are
300
not inconsistent with the Act.
291.

Maleski v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 471 S.W.2d 416, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.

-- Corpus Christi 1971, no writ); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Sapien, 458 S.W.2d 203,
205 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Akin, Workmen's Compensation, 26 Sw. L.J. 177, 178 (1972).
292. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hughes, 497 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. Sup. 1973).
293. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Kirchoff, 427 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Tex. Civ. App.

-Houston

[14th Dist.] 1968, no writ); see Torres v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 457

S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex. Sup. 1970).
294. Allstate Ins. Co. v. King, 444 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. Sup. 1969).

295. See Bray v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 483 S.W.2d 907, 911 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Houston [ist Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Baker v. Travelers Ins. Co., 483 S.W.2d
10 (Tex. Civ App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, no writ); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Warren,

447 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Northwestern Nat'l

Ins. Co. v. Kirchoff, 427 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Tex. Civ App-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968,
no writ).
296. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 7 (1967).
297. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7a (Supp. 1974).

298. See General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Hames, 416 S.W.2d 894,
897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, no writ); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Shilling,
259 S.W. 236, 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1923, no writ).
299. Tax. REV. CTv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4 (1967).

300. Id.; see Clawson v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 469 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Tex.
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Settlement Agreements
The Industrial Accident Board may approve compromise settlement agreements made between the employee and the insurer "where the liability of
the association or the extent of the injury of the employee is uncertain, indefinite or incapable of being satisfactorily established ..
"..
301 A settlement contract which is not approved by the Board is void, and the Board
may not approve a settlement agreement if it has received notice that either
30 2
of the parties wishes to withdraw its consent.
Although the decision to approve any compromise settlement agreement
lies totally within the discretion of the Board, 30 3 the Board rules provide that
settlements will be approved only upon certain specific conditions:
(a) That the Board is of the opinion that the agreement provides for
payment of compensation to claimant or claimants in an amount
to which he or they are justly entitled under the law.
(c) That the agreement is accompanied by a physician's report of the
findings of a recent examination of the employee.
(d) That the employee has achieved maximum recovery, 30
or4 that good
reason exists for settlement prior to maximum recovery.
In addition, "[n]o Compromise Settlement Agreement will be approved by
the Board for an amount less than the maximum weekly compensation provided by law at the time of the injury. ' 303 The Board also will not approve a settlement agreement if the injury to the employee resulted in his
30 6
death or total permanent disability.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971), af 'd, 475 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. Sup. 1972);
Galacia v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 348 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
301. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 12 (1967).
302. Brannam v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 151 Tex. 210, 213, 248 S.W.2d 118,
119 (1952).
303. See Industrial Accident Bd. v. Glenn, 144 Tex. 378, 382, 190 S.W.2d 805, 807
(1945) (parties could not obtain a writ of mandamus to compel the Board to approve
their settlement agreement).
304. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BD. R. 8.030.
305. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BD. R. 8.140.

306.

INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT

BD. R. 8.010. Once the Board has approved a compro-

mise settlement agreement, the only circumstance under which the employee may have
the agreement set aside is to file a lawsuit alleging that the defendant or his agent committed a fraud upon the employee causing a detriment to the employee. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Sprabery, 507 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974,
no writ); Mackintosh v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 486 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Esco v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 405 S.W.2d 860, 863
(Tex. Civ. App. Beaumont 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The binding effect of the settlement

agreement after approval by the Board can produce harsh results where the employee

or his attorney has underestimated the seriousness of the injury, since inadequacy of consideration does not constitute grounds for vitiating the settlement agreement. See Pearce
v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 412 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Sup. 1967); Gwinn v. Associated
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Upon the Board's approval of a settlement agreement, the insurance association has 20 days from the date of such approval to pay the agreed
amount.30 7 If the insurer fails to pay the settlement amount within 20 days,
the employee is entitled to an additional 12 percent of the settlement amount
3 08
as damages plus reasonable attorney's fees.
Hearings
Although there is no statutory provision for a specific term or session of
the Board, the Workmen's Compensation Act contemplates that the Board
will always be available to receive and adjudicate claims. 30 9 In the absence
of a compromise agreement, the Board will investigate the employee's claim
and make a final decision at a scheduled hearing.3 10 If the Board fails to
set a date for a hearing within a reasonable time, either party may obtain
a writ of mandamus to compel the Board to proceed toward a final disposition
of the claim. 31' The hearing may be postponed, however, so long as the
3 12
claimant is being paid compensation in the interim.
The hearing before the Board is equivalent to a trial in the sense that it
involves the presentation of evidence and arguments. Proceedings before the
Board, however, are informal,3 13 and the Board is not bound by the rules
3 14
of evidence and procedure which govern the courts.
Thus, the Board is vested with specific pre-hearing powers in order that
it may investigate claims and render decisions as quickly as possible. It has
,the broad power to "hold hearings, or to take testimony or make investigations" anywhere in Texas, 315 and in so doing may subpoena witnesses, administer oaths, investigate all matters of fact, and examine the books and recEmployers Lloyds, 280 S.W.2d 624, 627 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1955, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
307. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BD. R. 8.220. Although this 20-day requirement arises
from a Board rule, rather than from the language of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
the supreme court has held that the rule does not constitute an abuse of authority by
the Board. Pacific Employers' Ins. Co. v. Brannon, 150 Tex. 441, 448, 242 S.W.2d 185,
189 (1951).

308. TEX. REV. CIrV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5a (1967).
309. E.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Knouff, 271 S.W. 633, 635-36 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1925, writ ref'd).
310. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309a (Supp. 1974).
311. Id.; Kelly v. Industrial Accident Bd., 358 S.W.2d 874, 878 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1962, writ ref'd); Industrial Accident Bd. v. Hudson, 246 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1952, no writ).
312. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309a (Supp. 1974).

313. E.g., Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Knouff, 271 S.W. 633, 636 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Waco 1925, writ ref'd).
314. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Huntsman, 125 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Mote, 116 S.W.2d 427,
430 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1938, writ dism'd by agr.).
315. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 10 (Supp. 1974).
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ords of either party.A' 6 In addition, the Board may demand that the parties
appear at scheduled pre-hearing conferences,8 17 with the limitation that no
party may be required to travel more than "one hundred (100) miles from
the courthouse of the county of the claimant's residence or within a greater
distance than one hundred (100) miles of the courthouse of the county where
-the injury occurred." 18
One of the most important pre-hearing powers given to the Board is the
authority to demand that any employee making a claim submit himself for
a medical examination, and, if necessary, for surgery.3 19 The purpose of
this power is twofold: to enable the Board to obtain a professional opinion
concerning the alleged injury, and to prevent the insurer from making payments which would have been unnecessary if surgery had been performed.
The Board may require the employee to submit to repeated physical examinations,3 20 and if he refuses prescribed medical or surgical treatment, he
waives his right to compensation payments during the continuance of his refusal.

8 21

In those cases where an occupational disease is the basis of the claim, the
Board may, on its own motion or at the request of either party, appoint a
medical committee to investigate the source of the injury. 22 The statute
does not state, however, that the Board is bound by the committee's findings.3 23 In addition, where a claim for compensation alleges that death occurred due to an occupational disease, the Board will, on the request of either
3
party or on its own motion, order an autopsy. 24
The legislature's reasoning in not allowing an autopsy when the death is
alleged to have been caused from an accidental injury is perplexing, as many
deaths occur in which only an autopsy can accurately determine the cause.
Hypothetically, it might appear that an employee died from a slight blow on
the head, when, in fact, death resulted from a brain tumor. If such a case
were to come before the Board, the actual cause of death might not be discovered without an autopsy. Since the cause of death is the determining factor in awarding compensation, the Board should have discretion to order an
autopsy regardless of whether the claim is based on an occupational disease
3
or on an accidental injury. 25
316. TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4 (1967).
317. TEX. REV. CV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 10 (Supp. 1974).

318. Id.

.319. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4 (1967).

320. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Knouff, 271 S.W. 633, 638 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Waco 1925, writ ref'd).
321.

322.
323.
324.
325.
36 (3d

TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307,

Id. § 13.
Id. § 13.
Id. § 14.
But see 10 W.
ed. 1953).

§

4 (1967).

SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT
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After the parties have presented their cases, the Board will render its decision, awarding compensation only as provided in the Act.326 It has no duty
to base its decision either on a preponderance of the evidence or on a reasonable doubt.
In its discretion the Board may authorize compensation to be paid monthly
or quarterly rather than weekly as provided by statute. 27 In addition, the
association may be ordered to pay in one lump sum where "manifest hardship and injury would otherwise result. '3 28 Although it appears that the term
"manifest hardship" constitutes a strict limitation, the Board rules provide:
[i]n most cases a recovery of even -the maximum weekly compensation
rate would result in a hardship to the injured employee if the compensation payments were ordered to be paid on a weekly basis. Therefore,
an application in writing by an injured employee or by his attorney...
requesting -that the 3award
of the Board provide for payment in a lump
29
sum will be granted.
Attorney's fees .for representing claimants are subject to the approval of
the Board.330 With the exception of reasonable expenses incurred in preparing and presenting a claim, attorney's fees in excess of 25 percent of the
331
total compensation awarded may not be approved by the 'Board.
The Industrial Accident Board has the power to review and modify any
decision it renders. 332 If the compensation has been denied, the employee
must file an application for review within 1 year after the date of the decision. 33 3 Conversely, if compensation has been awarded, the employee or
association must file an application for review within the time period during
which compensation is to be paid.33 4 The petition for review must allege
"a change of condition, mistake or fraud. '335 A change of condition has been
judicially defined as a worsening of the claimant's condition, rather than as
a continued incapacity from the same injury.3 36 In order to obtain modifi326. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Elder, 155 Tex. 27, 31, 282 S.W.2d 371, 376
(1955); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Chancellor, 105 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Tex. Civ. App.El Paso 1937, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
327. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 12 (1967).
328. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 15 (1967).
329. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTrBD. R. 5.200.
330. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 7c (Supp. 1974).
331. Id. In addition, the Board may "bar persons guilty of unethical or fraudulent
conduct from practicing before the Board." TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4
(1967). Unethical conduct arises when the attorney violates the Canon of Ethics of
the State Bar of Texas or the Board Rules. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BD. R. 1.081. The
supreme court in Industrial Accident Bd. v. O'Dowd, 157 Tex. 432, 438, 303 S.W.2d
763, 767 (1957), held that this power is constitutional.
332. TEx. REV. ClV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12d (1967).

333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Gentry v. Travelers Ins. Co., 459 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex. Civ. App.--Houston
[14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
336. Espinoza v. Miller's Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex. Civ. App.-
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cation of a previous award because of "mistake," the claimant must prove
that at the hearing before the Board there was a mistake of fact as to the
actual injuries sustained.3 37 Finally, for modification based on "fraud," the
claimant must prove that he relied to his detriment on false representations
38
made by the defendant or his agent.a
APPEAL

If either party is not satisfied with the Board's decision, his only remedy
is to give notice of unwillingness to abide by the decision and to file suit
in a court of competent jurisdiction within the prescribed time limits. 339 The
Supreme Court of Texas has held that the decision of the Board on a review
application, whether it modifies a prior award or refuses to do so, is also subject to revision by the courts, even though there is no statutory authorization
340
for an appeal of a review decision.
In addition to adjudicating claims, court jurisdiction in workmen's compensation matters also extends to the enforcement of Board decisions. The
Workmen's Compensation Act provides that if the association fails to pay
compensation as ordered by the Board, and does not bring suit to set aside
the Board's decision, the claimant may bring suit to enforce it.3 41 If the
court sustains the award, the claimant is entitled to an additional 12 percent
3 42
of. the compensation award as damages and to reasonable attorney's fees.
If the association does not bring suit to set aside an adverse Board judgment
and fails to abide by the decision, the Board will certify such fact to the
Commissioner of Insurance. Such certification constitutes sufficient cause
3 43
for the Commissioner to revoke the license of the association.
There are two conditions which must be met in order to invoke court jurisdiction. The party contesting the Board's decision must, within 20 days after
the rendition of the decision, give notice to the Board that he will not abide
by the decision and must, within 20 days after giving such notice, file suit
Corpus Christi 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Shank, 140
S.W.2d 273, 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1940, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).

337. Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Shank, 140 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1940, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.); see Gentry v. Travelers Ins. Co., 459 S.W.2d 709,
712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
338. Brannon v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 148 Tex. 289, 293, 224 S.W.2d 466, 468
(1949); Young v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 488 S.W.2d 551, 553 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1972, no writ).
339. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (1967).
340. Clawson v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 475 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Tex. Sup. 1972).
341. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5a (1967).
342. Id.

343. Id. § 5. Under TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1.04(e) (Supp. 1974), however, the
insurance association does have the option to pay a sum not in excess of $10,000.00,
such sum being determined by the State Board of Insurance, instead of havings its license
revoked.
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in -the proper court.34 4 Unless both of these requisites are met, the Board's
decision becomes permanently binding upon the parties.3 45 On the other
hand, if notice and the suit are timely filed, the decision of the Board is set
3 46
aside and becomes unenforceable.
The two 20-day notice requirements have been rigidly enforced. For example, in Yancy v. Texas General Indemnity Co.,3 47 the postal service took
16 days to deliver the plaintiff's letter of notice to the Board, but the court
of civil appeals dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction because, even
though the letter should have reached the Board's address within the 20-day
deadline, the plaintiff had nevertheless failed -to meet the statutory requirement.3 48 Furthermore, in Clawson v. Texas Employers Insurance Association,349 the plaintiff filed his notice of non-abidance with the Board on the
day that he received notice of the Board's decision, which was the 21st day
after the date of the decision. The supreme court held that the 20-day time
limitation for giving notice to the Board begins to run from the date of the
award and not from the date on which the Board gives notice of its decision.3 50 The court granted that the result was "unfortunate" and an "injus351
tice," but stated that the statutory period for giving notice is absolute.
Although there should certainly be a point at which the Industrial Accident
Board's decisions become final and not appealable, the standard for determining this time need not be so inflexible. Texas courts have often stated that
the Workmen's Compensation Act should be liberally construed in order to
give effect to the beneficial purposes for which it was enacted.3 5 2 If plaintiffs were allowed to reinstate their claims upon a showing of good cause or
lack of fault in failing to meet the jurisdictional requirements, these purposes
would be more fully realized. Lack of fault and good cause requirements
would constitute limitations for bringing suit after the statutory deadline, but
they would be flexible enough to allow consideration of each case on its own
facts.
344. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (1967).

345. Clawson v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 475 S.W.2d 735, 737-38 (Tex. Sup.
1972); Gentry v. Travelers Ins. Co., 459 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Yancey v. Texas Gen. Indem. Co., 425 S.W.2d
683, 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
346. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (1967); Latham v. Security Ins. Co.,
491 S.W.2d 100, 104 (Tex. Sup. 1972).
347. 425 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
348. Id. at 685.
349. 475 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. Sup. 1972).

350. Id. at 738.

351. Id. at 738-39.
352. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Thomas, 415 S.W.2d 18, 19 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1967, no writ); accord, Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Steadman, 433
S.W.2d 756, 760 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968, no writ); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Adams, 407 S.W.2d 282, 287 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Jurisdictional requirements also include limitations on -the nature of the
claim which may be presented. The supreme court has provided that the
claim asserted in the courts must have a "fair and substantial identity" with
the claim presented before the Board. 853 Jurisdiction will not attach, for example, if the claimant asks the court for recovery due to an accidental injury
after he has based his original claim before the Board on an occupational
8 54
disease.
Jurisdiction is also dependent upon the amount in controversy, which is
determined, depending on the circumstances, either by the amount of the
award or by the amount alleged in the petition . 3 5 If the insurer files the suit,
jurisdiction will be determined by one of three methods. If the employee's
claim before the 'Board did not specify the monetary amount sought to be
recovered, the suit should be filed in the court having jurisdiction over the
amount awarded by the Board;3 56 but if the employee's claim before the
Board specifies the amount sought to be recovered, and if the award of the
Board equals or exceeds that amount, suit should be filed in the court having
jurisdiction over that amount;3 57 if, however, -the award of the Board is less
than the amount claimed by the employee, the amount shown in the claim
is the amount which determines jurisdiction.358 On the other hand, if the
employee brings the action, jurisdiction is always determined by the amount
claimed in the petition, provided that the amount is not shown to have been
fraudulently alleged in order to obtain jurisdiction in a particular court.3 59
The plaintiff must be careful to file his suit in the court of proper jurisdiction because article 5539a, which provides that on dismissal of a case due
to a want of jurisdiction 60 days is allowed to file the action in the proper
court, does not apply -to workmen's compensation cases.3 60 Therefore, if suit
is filed in the wrong court and the 20-day deadline for filing passes, the decision of the Board becomes non-appealable. 361
A suit filed by an employee against his employer rather than the carrier
will not invoke the jurisdiction of the court.3 6 2 If the Board's decision is
353. Johnson v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 464 S.W.2d 83, 87 (Tex. Sup. 1971); see
Consolidated Underwriters v. Wright, 408 S.W.2d 140, 145 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
354. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Seale, 366 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1963, writ dism'd by agr.).
355. Booth v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 132 Tex. 237, 246, 252, 123 S.W.2d 322,
327, 330 (1938).
356. Id. at 331.
357. Id. at 330.
358. Id. at 330.
359. Id. at 330.
360. TEx. REV. Cw. STAT. ANN. art. 5539a (1958); e.g., Pan American Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Rowlett, 479 S.W.2d 782, 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
361. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (1967).
362. Brown v. McMillan Material Co., 108 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1937, writ ref'd).
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against the insurer, it is he, and not the employer, who must file suit against
6
the employeea 3
The Workmen's Compensation Act specifically provides that a suit brought
by either party to set aside the decision of the Board shall be decided on
trial de novo.36 4 If the party filing suit has given timely notice of unwillingness to abide by the Board's final decision and has timely filed his suit, the
decision of the Board becomes a nullity as between the parties before the
65
court.
The pleadings of the parties are governed by the rules of civil procedure. 366
If the employee initiates the suit, he must allege in his petition that he is
an employee of a subscriber under the Workmen's Compensation Act, that
he suffered an injury while in the scope of his employment, 367 that he gave
the required notice of his injury to the employer, and that he filed his claim
for compensation with the Board within the required time period.8 66 Furthermore, since a court has no jurisdiction to hear a workmen's compensation case
until after the Board has made a final decision on the claim, 6 9 either party
bringing suit must allege that the Board has heard and determined the
claim, 70 that notice of non-abidance of the Board's decision was made within
the statutory period allowed, 8 71 and that the suit to set aside the Board's decision was filed within the time allowed by law. 3 72 The Rules of Civil Procedure provide that
363. Trx. REv.Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (1967).
364. Id.
365. Latham v. Security Ins. Co., 491 S.W.2d 100, 104 (Tex. Sup. 1972); Lowery

v. Transport Ins. Co., 451 S.W.2d 595, 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970, no writ);
Hardware 'Mut. Cas. Co. v. Clark, 360 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1962,
writ dism'd).

366. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 147 S.W.2d 866, 871 (Tex. Civ. App.Forth Worth 1941, no writ).
367. See Mosqueda v. Home Indem. Co., 443 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 473 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Sup. 1971); TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3b (1967).
368. See Mosqueda v. Home Indemn. Co., 443 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 473 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Sup. 1971); TEx.
REV.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (1967).
369. Industrial Accident Bd. v. Glenn, 144 Tex. 378, 381, 190 S.W.2d 805, 807
(1945); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 488 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
370. Huff v. Insurance Co. of North America, 394 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
371. See Mosqueda v. Home Indem. Co., 443 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 473 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Sup. 1971); Worly
v. Petroleum Cas. Co., 24 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1930, writ ref'd); TEx.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (1967).
372. Mosqueda v. Home Indem. Co., 443 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 473 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Sup. 1971); TEx. REV. CiV.
STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (1967).
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the following, if pleaded, shall be presumed to be true as pleaded and
have been done and filed in legal time and manner, unless denied by
verified pleadings:
(1) Notice of injury.
(2) Claim for compensation.
(3) Award of the Board.
(4) Notice of intention not to abide by the award of the Board.
(5) Filing of suit to set aside the award.
(6) That the insurance company alleged to have been the carrier of
the workmen's compensation insurance at the time of the alleged
injury was in fact the carrier thereof.
(7) That there was good cause for not filing claim with the Industrial
Accident Board within the six months' period provided by statute.
73
(8) Wage rate .
If any of the above are pleaded, and are not specifically denied, they will be
3 74
presumed correct.
In rendering its decision, the court will apply the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act rather than review the Board's decision.3 7 5 It is,
in fact, reversible error to introduce the decision of the Board into evidence
if the opposing attorney objects.3 76 Since Board decisions may not be collaterally attacked, an allegation either that there was insufficient evidence or
that the Board failed to properly consider the evidence does not constitute
377
grounds on which the decision may be judicially set aside.
The case is tried as in all other civil cases, with the court deciding all issues
of law and the jury resolving all questions of fact.3 78 Likewise, the rules of
evidence apply in workmen's compensation cases in the same manner as in
any other civil case. 3 7 9 A unique procedural trait of workmen's compensation cases is that the party claiming compensation always has the burden of
proof at the trial, even if the suit is brought by the insurer.38 0 Although 'the
claimant must prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence, 38 ' the bur373. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93(n).
374. Id.; see TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307b (1967).
375. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (1967); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n
v. Miller, 137 Tex. 449, 453, 154 S.W.2d 450, 452 (1941).
376. Tanner v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 438 S.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Beaumont 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Garcia v. Home Indem. Co., 474 S.W.2d 535,
538 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, no writ).
377. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Hames, 416 S.W.2d 894, 896
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, no writ).
378. See Truck Ins. Exch. v. Michling, 364 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Sup. 1963);
Holmes v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 263 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1953, no writ).
379. Truck Ins. Exch. v. Michling, 364 S.W.2d 172, 173 (Tex. Sup. 1963).
380. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 8307, § 5 (1967); Garcia v. Home Indem. Co.,
474 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, no writ).
381. Royal Indem. Co. v. Smith, 456 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth,
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den shifts to the insurer when the claimant has presented evidence sufficient
to make a prima facie case.38 2 The Act provides "no fixed rule of evidence
by which a claimant is required to establish the fact that he has suffered an
3' 8 3
injury which caused disability.
Although the majority of states follows the "substantial evidence rule,"
which provides essentially that the courts will review the Board's decision and
sustain its judgment if there was substantial evidence in existence at the time
of the decision to support it, 38 4 the Texas system of providing a trial de novo
gives absolutely no weight to the Board's decree. 38 5 There are obvious advantages and disadvantages to both the minority and the majority system. The
majority system, by conferring judicial powers upon the administrative
agency, relieves the courts of having to hear fully workmen's compensation
cases which have already been litigated before an agency created especially
for that purpose. The theory is that an Industrial Accident Board, in hearing
only workmen's compensation cases, develops a superior expertise in reviewing such cases. 3s8 Another argument in favor of providing for judicial review
rather that trial de novo is that the Board does not become a "useless appendage," having its decision voided by the mere bringing of suit.38 7 The principal disadvantage to the majority system is that the industrial accident board
becomes, in effect, an informal trial court consisting of members who might
1970, no writ); Thompson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 449 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, no writ); Holmes v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 263 S.W.2d
615, 617 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1953, no writ); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Stubbs,
91 S.W.2d 407, 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1936, writ ref'd).
382. Garcia v. Home Indem. Co., 474 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1971, no writ); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Thames, 252 S.W.2d 228, 229-30 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Southern Sur. Co. v. Scheel, 49 S.W.2d
937, 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1932), rev'd on other grounds, 125 Tex. 1, 78
S.W.2d 173 (1935).
383. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Stephenson, 496 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1973, no writ). In fact, testimony of the claimant or other lay witnesses may support a jury verdict awarding compensation even if such testimony is contradicted by expert testimony. Id. at 188; Royal Indem. Co. v. Smith, 456 S.W.2d 218,
221 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970, no writ).
384. Jones v. Marsh, 148 Tex. 362, 369, 224 S.W.2d 198, 202 (1949); 3 A. LARSON,
THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 80.00 (1973); Gwinn, Judicial Review of Administrative Orders in Texas: A Comparative Analysis: The Board of Medical Examiners, Texas, California and Arkansas, 23 BAYLOR L. REV. 34, 39 (1971).
385. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § (1967); Latham v. Security Ins.
Co., 491 S.W.2d 100, 104 (Tex. Sup. 1972); Lowery v. Transport Ins. Co., 451 S.W.2d
595, 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970, no writ); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Clark,
360 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ dism'd).
386. See Southern Canal Co. v. State Bd. of Water Eng'r, 159 Tex. 227, 235, 318
S.W.2d 619, 625 (1958); 3 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 79.00
(1973); Gwinn, Judicial Review of Administrative Orders in Texas: A Comparative
Analysis: The Board of Medical Examiners, Texas, California and Arkansas, 23 BAYLOR
L. REV. 34, 73 (1971).
387. Southern Canal Co. v. State Bd. of Water Eng'r, 159 Tex. 227, 235, 318 S.W.2d
619, 625 (1958).
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